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SIPDIS - GENEVA FOR JCIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2029

TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [KACT](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [US](#) [KTIA](#) [RS](#)

SUBJECT: U.S. NON-PAPER ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY  
VEHICLES AND OPERATIONALLY DEPLOYED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR  
WARHEADS

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, Director, VCI/SI.  
Reason: 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (U) Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Rose Gottemoeller, during continuing negotiations regarding a START follow-on treaty with Russian MFA Director of Security and Disarmament Affairs Anatoliy Antonov, undertook to provide to the Russian Federation a U.S. non-paper explaining the U.S. approach for counting strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads in the context of the START follow-on treaty.

¶2. (S) ACTION REQUEST: Embassy Moscow is requested to provide the text contained in paragraph 3 below to appropriate host government officials in the form of a diplomatic note as soon as possible on June 15. Washington will provide the embassy with a courtesy Russian-language translation of the note in paragraph 3; however, delivery of the demarche should not be delayed if the translation is delayed. Embassy is requested to confirm the delivery of the note, the name and office of the official to whom it was delivered, the date of the delivery, and any comment/reaction provided at that time.

¶3. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation)  
Begin text.

U.S. Non-paper  
(Date)

On Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles and Operationally  
Deployed Strategic Nuclear Warheads

Limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV) and operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNW)  
- During the Moscow meetings, the U.S. Delegation committed to explain more fully the U.S. approach with respect to limits on SNDVs and ODSNW.  
- The U.S. approach is a hybrid of the START Treaty limit on deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers, and the Moscow Treaty limit on ODSNW.  
- The limit on each is independent of the other. There is no direct relationship between the number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; and the number of ODSNW.

On strategic nuclear delivery vehicles

- For strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the U.S. approach would continue to use the START conventions for counting deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers.  
- For the purpose of counting deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers against the limit for SNDVs, the general rule would be that each deployed launcher of ICBMs would be considered to contain a deployed ICBM.

- However, under the U.S. approach, silo launchers that do not contain an ICBM and are no longer usable for launching and ICBM would not count against the limit for SNDVs. These launchers would either be eliminated using simplified elimination procedures (to be agreed) or exempted from the limitations of the treaty through an agreed exemption, which could include transparency measures.

- ICBMs of a type tested and deployed for the delivery of nuclear warheads, but equipped with non-nuclear warheads, would count against the SNDV limit.

- ICBMs of a type tested and deployed solely for the delivery of non-nuclear warheads would not count against the SNDV limit.

- For the purpose of counting deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers against the limit for SNDVs, the general rule would be that each deployed launcher of SLBMs would be considered to contain a deployed SLBM.

- SLBMs of a type tested and deployed for the delivery of nuclear warheads, but equipped with non-nuclear warheads, would still count against the SNDV limit.

- However, SLBMs of a type tested and deployed solely for the delivery of non-nuclear warheads would not count against the SNDV limit.

- Modified SLBM launchers on SSGNs would not be considered to contain SLBMs and would not count against the SNDV limit. These launchers, which were modified in shipyards, are no longer capable of launching an SLBM and thus would be exempted from the limitations of the treaty through an agreed exemption for SSGNs, which could include transparency measures.

- Launchers on SSBNs in refueling overhaul would count against the SNDV limit.

- For heavy bombers, all heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments would count against the limit for SNDVs.

- Under the U.S. approach, heavy bombers that were originally equipped for nuclear armaments but that are no longer usable for the delivery of nuclear armaments would not count against the limit for SNDVs. These heavy bombers would either be eliminated using simplified elimination procedures (to be agreed) or exempted from the limitations of the treaty through an agreed exemption, which could include transparency measures.

On operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNW)

- For ICBMs in their launchers, the actual number of nuclear warheads on each ICBM would count against the ODSNW limit.

- ICBM launchers that do not contain an ICBM subject to the treaty would not contain ODSNW.

- For SLBMs in their launchers, the actual number of nuclear warheads on each SLBM would count against the ODSNW limit.

- SLBM launchers that do not contain an SLBM subject to the treaty would not contain ODSNW.

- SLBM launchers on SSBNs in refueling overhaul do not contain SLBMs throughout the lengthy overhaul period and thus would not contain ODSNW.

- For ICBMs and SLBMs in their launchers, if such ICBMs and SLBMs are equipped with non-nuclear warheads, those warheads would not count against the ODSNW limit. Such launchers could be subject to transparency measures.

- For heavy bombers, nuclear armaments loaded on a heavy bomber and nuclear armaments for heavy bombers located in specified weapon storage areas associated with or directly supporting heavy bomber air bases would count against the ODSNW limit.

End text.

CLINTON